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20121201
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we're really engaging diplomatically with china and other members of united nations security council on tougher resolutions and possibly sanctions. >> making any progress? >> you have to talk to the ambassadors in new york and the sea to figure out what is going on. -- d.c. to figure out what is going on. >> in beijing, what is the view among the leaders you can tell of kim jong-u7n? -- kim jong-un? >> china would like all the parties that are part of this sixth party talks her to get back to the table, to see if we can encourage better behavior from north korea as opposed to imposing sanctions now and trying to coerce north korea into the fold. that is a difference of opinion of strategy. china really believes we ought to be engaged with north korea. united states feels every time we've tried to engage with north korea, they basically turnaround and failed to respond. >> what is the most important thing the chinese leaders want from you every day? >> the want greater cooperation with united states, because the understand how important united states is for their own economy.
relations with china and japan. and with 100 i.n.f. missiles directed at them how was he going to do that? it was not in their interests to have 100 missiles out of europe. and it was really in their interest. now we've access of records of politburo discussions. let me go back to a couple of words about president reagan. before he first met gorbachev, he wrote out on a yellow pad several pages, without any prompting from anybody, what he wanted to achieve at geneva in his first meeting. bud mcfarland handed me this as we were getting on the plane to go to geneva saying there is what the president has in his mind. if he is wrong somewhere we will have to straighten him out in briefings. actually, it was a very per self-active paper and among -- pe perce perceptive. one of them was a lack of trust or we were not going to some anything else. added if i don't achieve anything else, i must convince gorbachev that though we don't want an arms race, if he wants one he is going to lose it. and, number three, whatever we achieve, we must not call it victory. because that will simply make any furt
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